• The Cheating Or Cooperate Games On
• The Cheating Or Cooperate Games
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Editors note: This story is part of a Feature 'The Doping Dilemma' from the April 2008 issue of Scientific American.

If the hunter chose to cooperate, the meat would be divided so that everyone benefits but the hunter still enjoys a slightly larger share. They would also receive a benefit in the future when. Game theorists have nothing better to offer than the advice to flip a mental coin (or the physical one, since they have one in the money game) and cheat with a probability of.5. This game has a name.

1. Suppose there are only two automobile companies, Ford and Chevrolet. Ford believes that Chevrolet will match any price it sets, but Chevrolet too is interested in maximizing profit. Use the following price and profit data to answer the following questions.
2. THE GAME OF TRUST You have one choice. In front of you is a machine: if you put a coin in the machine, the other player gets three coins – and vice versa. You both can either choose to COOPERATE (put in coin), or CHEAT (don't put in coin).
3. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a thought experiment originating from game theory. Designed to analyze the ways in which we cooperate, it strips away the variations between specific situations where people are called to overcome the urge to be selfish. Political scientist Robert Axelrod lays down its foundations in The Evolution of Cooperation.

Why do cyclists cheat? The game theory analysis of doping in cycling (below), which is closely modeled on the game of prisoner’s dilemma, shows why cheating by doping is rational, based solely on the incentives and expected values of the payoffs built into current competition. (The expected value is the value of a successful outcome multiplied by the probability of achieving that outcome.) The payoffs assumed are not unrealistic, but they are given only for illustration; the labels “high,” “temptation,” “sucker” and “low” in the matrices correspond to the standard names of strategies in prisoner’s dilemma. It is also assumed that if competitors are playing “on a level playing field” (all are cheating, or all are rule-abiding), their winnings will total $1 million each, without further adjustment for a doping advantage.

—Peter Brown, Staff Editor

Game Assumptions: Current Competition

• Value of winning the Tour de France: $10 million
• Likelihood that a doping rider will win the Tour de France against nondoping competitors: 100%
• Value of cycling professionally for a year, when the playing field is level: $1 million
• Cost of getting caught cheating (penalties and lost income): $1 million
• Likelihood of getting caught cheating: 10%
• Cost of getting cut from a team (forgone earnings and loss of status): $1 million
• Likelihood that a nondoping rider will get cut from a team for being noncompetitive: 50%

The Cheating Or Cooperate Games On

Game Assumptions: After Reforms

• New, higher cost of getting caught cheating (penalties and lost income): $5 million
• New, higher likelihood of getting caught cheating: 90%
• Consequent new, lower likelihood that a non-doping rider will get cut from a team for being noncompetitive: 10%

The Cheating Or Cooperate Games

The Cheating Or Cooperate Game Show